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Abstract
This paper introduces an order on types by which the so-called mono-
tone comparative statics is valid in all supermodular games with incomplete
information. We fully characterize this order in terms of what we call the
common certainty of optimism. We say that type t
′
i is higher than type ti
in the order of the common certainty of optimism if t
′
i is more optimistic
about state than ti; t
′
i is more optimistic that all players are more opti-
mistic about state than ti; and so on ad infinitum. First, we show that
whenever the common certainty of optimism holds, monotone comparative
statics holds in all supermodular games. Second, we show the converse. We
construct an “optimism-elicitation game” as a single supermodular game
with the property that whenever the common certainty of optimism fails,
monotone comparative statics fails as well.
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1 Introduction
In many economic problems, we are often interested in studying the effects of
changes in certain variables (“parameters”) on the behaviors of economic agents.
This is well known as comparative statics. There are numerous examples showing
that the comparative statics analysis is ubiquitous in economics, such as in the
analyses of bidding strategies in auctions, portfolio choices in financial markets,
optimal taxation policy, and so on. The literature on supermodular games shows
that, given certain conditions1 on the way the parameters enter the players’ payoff
functions, monotone changes in those parameters affect the players’ equilibria in a
monotonic way, a property called monotone comparative statics.
Although many papers in the literature study supermodular games with com-
plete information, in practice, it is often the case that players do not observe some
of the parameters of the game they play, or they have different information about
them. In this paper, we study monotone comparative statics in supermodular
games with such incomplete information. Athey (2001, 2002), McAdams (2003),
Van Zandt (2010), and Van Zandt and Vives (2007) consider supermodular games
with incomplete information. Often their main motivation is existence of equilib-
ria (with nice properties such as in pure and monotone strategies), while our main
focus is purely on monotone comparative statics. Also, they consider different as-
sumptions with respect to the players’ information structure, reflecting different
levels of generality in this respect. In this sense, the setting in our paper is clos-
est to that of Van Zandt and Vives (2007) where no restriction is made on each
player’s belief and higher-order beliefs (except for certain topological and order
1In particular, certain forms of complementarity (such as supermodularity, increasing differ-
ence, and single-crossing conditions) among economic variables and players’ actions are shown
to be important. See, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994),
Topkis (1998), and Vives (1990).
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structures). Specifically, we allow not only standard common-prior type spaces,
but also non-common-prior cases where the players are allowed to enjoy arbitrary
heterogeneous beliefs and higher-order beliefs. Indeed, in our setup, any type in
the universal type space (and hence any belief hierarchy) is allowed.2
Including non-common-prior environments in our analysis is not just for tech-
nical generality. In some economic problems, it is well recognized that assuming
a common prior may be too demanding. For example, the cerebrated no-trade
theorem (Milgrom and Stokey (1982)) shows that, in certain trading contexts with
common-value assets and a common prior,3 all equilibria exhibit no trading, even
though, in reality, many traders appear to be involved in speculative trading. As
another example, the behavioral economics literature propose a number of ways
real economic agents “wrongly” process information and evidence for them.4
With strategic interaction, such heterogeneity in (high-order) beliefs makes
comparative statics much more subtle. Even if a trader becomes “more optimistic”
about the fundamental, which makes him eager to “trade more” ceteris paribus, he
may not want to do so if he believes that the other traders’ beliefs change in the way
that his “trading more” would hurt him. Our result could be useful in the analysis
of such situations. Indeed, our result suggests that, even in such heterogenous-
belief environments, there is a sense in which monotone comparative statics can
still be conducted. For example, imagine that investors agree that certain news
is “good news” for a startup even though they do not agree on “how good the
news is” (because they may believe different underlying distributions). We show
that this qualitative agreement may be sufficient to drive up the stock price of this
startup.5
To explain our main idea more formally, imagine an incomplete information
supermodular game with a parameter space Θ. Each player’s interim belief is
2See Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenberger and Dekel (1993).
3In fact, their no-trade result holds with concordant beliefs, and a common-prior environment
is a special case.
4For example, see the cursed equilibrium of Eyster and Rabin (2005) and the analogy-based
expectation equilibrium of Jehiel (2005).
5In Section 7, we also consider a trading environment where it is common knowledge that the
asset has pure common value, but with heterogenous (high-order) beliefs about the exact value.
Monotone comparative statics for the size / possibility of trade is conducted with respect to the
size of the belief divergence between players.
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identified by his type, which induces his belief hierarchy, that is, his first-order
belief over Θ, his second-order belief (i.e., the joint belief over Θ and the other
players’ first-order beliefs), and so on, ad infinitum. We order two types of each
player based on their belief hierarchies. Namely, we say that type tˆi of player i is
higher than ti in the sense of common certainty of optimism (henceforth, CCO)
if tˆi’s first-order belief on Θ stochastically dominates ti’s first-order belief; tˆi’s
second-order belief (jointly about Θ and the first-order beliefs of the other players)
stochastically dominates ti’s second-order belief; and so on ad infinitum. That is, tˆi
is more “optimistic” about the realization of θ ∈ Θ than ti; tˆi is more “optimistic”
about the “optimism” of the other players, and so on.
In Theorem 1, we show that the common certainty of optimism is sufficient for
monotone comparative statics to hold in all supermodular games. More specifically,
we show that if type t
′
i is higher than type ti in the CCO sense, then, t
′
i’s action
in the least (greatest) equilibrium is higher than ti’s action in the least (greatest)
equilibrium in all supermodular games.6 The key observation for the proof of
this theorem is that the least and greatest equilibria of an incomplete-information
supermodular game (under certain regularity conditions) coincide with the game’s
least and greatest interim correlated rationalizability (henceforce, ICR) of Dekel,
Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), which is fully identified by his belief hierarchy.
Of course, different orders on these types may be induced if different games are
considered. Theorem 1 establishes that our CCO order is the “coarsest” order of
types such that, if a type of a player is higher than another in this order, then the
former plays a higher (least and greatest) equilibrium action than the latter in any
supermodular game.7
Theorem 2 shows its converse. Namely, we construct a supermodular game,
which we refer to as an “optimism-elicitation game” such that, if type t
′
i is not
higher than ti in the CCO sense, t
′
i’s action in the least (greatest) equilibrium of
6The set of equilibria in supermodular games is a complete lattice, and in particular, admits
the least and greatest equilibria. Establishing monotone comparative statics for those extremal
equilibria, monotone comparative statics for the set of equilibria (in an appropriate set-order
sense) is established.
7Of course, this may not be the only interesting order. For example, one may have a specific
supermodular game in mind, and desire to conduct comparative statics only in this game. Al-
though we provide some preliminary argument on this issue in Section 6, we leave this for our
future research.
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this game is not higher than ti’s action in the least (greatest) equilibrium. In
other words, the CCO order and monotone comparative statics in this game are
equivalent. The construction is reminiscent of scoring rules in belief-elicitation
procedures.8 However, there are some important differences. First, although a
scoring rule is usually constructed to elicit a single decision maker’s belief about
an uncertain variable, our game is to elicit multiple players’ belief hierarchies.
Second, because our goal is to construct a supermodular game, the action space of
each player cannot be the space of all possible belief hierarchies, because it then
does not constitute a lattice (with respect to first-order stochastic dominance). In
this sense, our construction cannot be a straightforward extension of a standard
(single-player) scoring rule to multiple players. Indeed, the action space of our
game is based on the set of capacities,9 in order to guarantee the (complete) lattice
structure of the action space. A further complication arises with multiple players,
because we must consider its “(infinitely-)higher-order” version. The key to our
construction is a careful choice of a topological structure for the set of capacities.10
The condition we identify is purely based on the players’ first and higher-order
beliefs with respect to the state variables, and does not depend on which game we
consider, as long as the game is supermodular. In this sense, our results may be
useful in the context of mechanism design, where a game is not fixed but rather
endogensouly constructed. The reader is referred to Mathevet (2010) for the study
of designing supermodular mechanisms, motivated by the desirable features of
supermodular games in terms of learning and bounded rationality in certain senses.
We consider the application of our paper to mechanism design as one promissing
direction of our future work.11
8Savage (1971) proposes the proper scoring rule to elicit an individual’s belief.
9A capacity can be interpreted as a non-additive (hence not-necessarily probabilistic) belief.
See Schmeidler (1986, 1989) for its application to decision theory.
10For example, a weak∗-topology, which is standard to topologize the set of probability mea-
sures, is not applicable (at least in a straightforward manner) to topologize the set of capacities.
Instead, our topology (or more specifically, a norm) is such that the action space is made isomor-
phic to a closed subset of a Hilbert cube, and hence a compact metric space. This nice structure
is exploited to prove Theorem 2.
11For example, our result shows that one type of a player must play a higher action than
another type of that player in any supermodular game. Viewing a game as a mechanism that
implements certain allocation rule, such a condition may imply natural monotonicity structures
on implementable social choice rules.
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As briefly mentioned above, this paper is closest to Van Zandt and Vives (2007)
who also investigate supermodular games with incomplete information. Van Zandt
and Vives consider an implicit (Harsanyi) type space endowed with an exogeneously
given partial order and then introduce each type’s belief map that is consistent
with this exogenous order. They establish the existence of the least and greatest
equilibria that are monotone in types as well as the following monotone comparative
statics result: the greatest and least equilibria are higher if there is a first-order
stochastic dominant shift in the interim belief. Naturally, our CCO order and their
exogenous order structure are quite related, discussed in detail in Section 6.
At a more abstract level, the motivation of our paper is closely related to
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) and Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong
(2010, 2016). Based on the observation that the interim correlated rationalizability
(ICR) correspondence is not continuous with respect to the product topology on
the universal type space,12 Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) introduce what
they call the strategic topology, and show that this is the coarsest possible topology
with respect to which the ICR correspondence is continuous (i.e. both upper
and lower-hemi continuous) in all finite games. Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and
Xiong (2010, 2016) further investigate the strategic topology based on ICR. They
also propose the uniform strategic topology, which is described directly based on
belief hierarchies, and study its relationship with the strategic topology. In this
sense, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) and Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and
Xiong (2010, 2016) establish “economically meaningful” topologies on the universal
type space, thereby enhances a better understanding of this seemingly complicated
mathematical object. Quite analogously, our attempt is to introduce a partial
order over the universal type space (rather than topologies) that is “economically
meaningful” in the sense that this order fully characterizes monotone comparative
statics in all supermodular games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
basic setup and definitions and identify the least and greatest equilibria via the
iterated elimination of never best responses. Section 3 establishes the common
certainty of optimism (CCO) as a sufficient condition for monotone comparative
statics to hold in all supermodular games. In Section 4, by focusing on the single-
12More specifically, it satisfies upper-hemi continuity but not necessarily lower-hemi continuity.
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person decision making problem, we show that the CCO order is also necessary
for monotone comparative statics to hold in all supermodular games. We establish
this by constructing a single supermodular game. In Section 5, we extend this
result to the multi-player situation. Section 6 provides a detailed discussion about
the relationship with Van Zandt and Vives (2007). In Section 7, we provide an
application of our CCO order on types in the context of the no-trade result of
Milgrom and Stokey (1982). Section 8 concludes the paper and the Appendix
(Section 9) contains all the omitted proofs from the main body of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We shall prepare the preliminary materials needed throughout the paper. Sec-
tion 2.1 introduces first-order stochastic dominance. Section 2.2 introduces belief
hierarchies and defines the concept of common certainty of optimism. We de-
fine supermodular games in Section 2.3 and their Bayesian equilibria in Section
2.4. It is well-known that, in a supermodular game, the set of Bayesian equilibria
has a lattice structure, and hence, admits the least and greatest equilibria. As is
standard in the literature, monotone comparative statics are about those extremal
equilibria.
2.1 First Order Stochastic Dominance
Let X be a separable, complete metric space.13 Consider two Borel probability
measures, b and b′, on X. Let ∆(X) denote the set of all Borel-measurable prob-
ability distributions over X endowed with the weak∗-topology. In Section 5, we
introduce capacities (non-additive measures) over X endowed with a finer topol-
ogy than the weak∗-topology. In such a case, we avoid the use of the notation
like ∆(X), which usually means the set of all probability distributions. We say
that a partial order  on X is closed if, for any pair of sequences {xn}, {yn} ∈ X,
whenever xn  yn for each n and xn → x, and yn → y as n→∞, we have x  y.
We endow X with such a closed partial order .
We say that b
′
first-order stochastically dominates b if, for any increasing, mea-
13Examples include any finite set, [0, 1], Rd, and Lp(Rd).
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surable, and bounded function f : X → R,∫
x
f(x)db
′ ≥
∫
x
f(x)db,
and b
′
strictly first-order stochastically dominates b if b
′
first-order stochastically
dominates b and, in addition, the inequality is strict at least for some f that is
increasing, measurable, and bounded.
Under the following two assumptions on X and , we have an alternative
representation of first-order stochastic dominance, which is used in Sections 4 and
5. We believe that they are mild requirements. For example, a Euclidean space
with the usual component-wise partial order satisfies them.
Assumption 1. There exists a countable dense subset X0 ⊆ X for which for each
x ∈ X and ε > 0, there is y ∈ X0 such that y ≥ x and y ∈ Bε(x).14
Because X is separable, it has a countable dense subset. But our assumption
requires an additional condition, which is a sort of “local non-satiation”.15
To introduce the second assumption, for each x ∈ X, let up(x) ⊆ X be the
smallest upper set that contains x, i.e., up(x) = {y ∈ X|y ≥ x}. For each Y ⊆ X,
let up(Y ) ⊆ X be the smallest upper set that contains Y , i.e., up(Y ) = ⋃y∈Y up(y).
The second assumption says that the upper-set correspondence is continuous.
Assumption 2. For each Y ⊆ X and ε > 0, there exists δ(Y, ε) > 0 such that,
for any Z ⊆ X with d(Y, Z) < δ(Y, ε),16 we have d(up(Y ), up(Z)) < ε.
For each Y ⊆ X, let clup(Y ) denote the closure of up(Y ). The next result
shows that, under the assumptions above, we can show that we do not need to
check all increasing, measurable, and bounded functions to determine whether b
first-order stochastically dominates b′. We only need to check a countable subclass
14Bε(x) denotes the open ball around x with radius ε.
15In their analysis of revealed preference theory, Chambers, Echenique, and Lambert (2017)
use the countable order property, which is similar to our Assumption 1. See also Proposition 13
of their paper for two prominent cases where the countable order property is satisfied.
16By abuse of notation, we let
d(Y,Z) = max{sup
y∈Y
inf
z∈Z
d(y, z), sup
z∈Z
inf
y∈Y
d(y, z)}
denote the Hausdorff metric between Y, Z ⊆ X.
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of “clup” sets. The proof is in the appendix, but it is worth mentioning that the
proposition (in particular, Lemma 1 as its intermediate step) requires that X be
Polish (i.e., separable and completely metrizable) and  be a closed partial order.
Proposition 1. Let b, b
′ ∈ ∆(X). b (first-order) stochastically dominates b′ if
and only if, for any Y0 ⊆ X0, b(clup(Y0)) ≥ b′(clup(Y0)). In addition, b strictly
stochastically dominates b′ if and only if the inequality holds for any Y0 ⊆ X0 and
it is strict at least for some Y0 ⊆ X0.
Proof. First, we state the following intermediate result, due to Kamae, Krengel,
and O’Brien (1977). Its proof is omitted.
Lemma 1. Let b, b
′ ∈ ∆(X). b′ first-order stochastically dominates b (denoted
b
′ SD b) if and only if b′(Y ) ≥ b(Y ) for any Y ∈ U(X). In this case, we say
that b
′
is more optimistic than b. In addition, b
′
strictly first-order stochastically
dominates b if and only if b
′ SD b and b′(Y ) > b(Y ) for some Y ∈ U(X).
The result states that it is enough to consider all the closed upper sets (instead
of all the increasing, measurable, and bounded functions) to establish a first-order
stochastic dominance relation (and its strict variant) between two probability mea-
sures. We relegate the rest of the proof to the Appendix.
2.2 Belief Hierarchies
Throughout this paper, let I denote the set of (finitely many) players, and let
Θ denote the payoff-relevant state space. We assume that (i) Θ is a separable,
complete metric space; (ii) for each i ∈ I, there exists a closed partial order over
Θ, denoted by Θ,i; and (iii) Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied for X = Θ and
=Θ,i,17 where the corresponding countable dense subset is denoted by Θ0.18
It is often the case in practice that the players only partially and asymmetrically
observe θ before they play a particular game. We represent their beliefs over θ and
over each other’s beliefs by types. Let (Ti,Ti, pii)i∈I be a type space where each Ti
17To be clear, these assumptions are not used for the results in Section 3, but used in Sections
4 and 5.
18Although it is possible that this corresponding countable subset may vary across players
(hence it may be denoted by Θ0,i), we can set Θ0 =
⋃
i∈I Θ0,i with which Assumptions 1 and 2
can be satisfied.
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represents player i’s set of types; each Ti represents a sigma-algebra over Ti and
T and T−i represent the product sigma-algebra over T and T−i, respectively; and
a Ti-measurable pii : Ti → ∆(Θ × T−i) is player i’s interim belief map about the
parameter and the other players’ types.
Observe that, given any type space (Ti,Ti, pii)i∈I , we can deduce the belief
hierarchy of each type ti of each player i as follows. Define Z
1
j = ∆(Θ) for j ∈ I,
and endow it with the partial order induced by first-order stochastic dominance and
with the weak-∗ topology. Define Z1−i =
∏
j 6=i Z
1
j , and endow it with the product
order and the product topology. Then, for each k ≥ 1, inductively define Zk+1j =
∆(Θ× Z1−j × · · · × Zk−j) for j ∈ I endowed with the stochastic-dominance partial
order and weak-∗ topology; and Zk+1−i =
∏
j 6=i Z
k+1
j endowed with the product order
and the product topology. Then, (i) his first-order belief is defined by h1i (ti) =
margΘpii(ti) ∈ Z1i , i.e., for each measurable Θ˜ ⊆ Θ,
h1i (ti)[Θ˜] = pii(ti)[Θ˜× T−i];
and inductively for each k ≥ 1, (ii) his (k+1)th-order belief is defined by hk+1i (ti) =
margΘ×Z1−i×···×Zk−ipii(ti) ∈ Z
k+1
i . The belief hierarchy of ti is then defined by
(hki (ti))
∞
k=1.
We now introduce this paper’s fundamental concept of common certainty of
optimism. Let ti and t
′
i be two types of player i. Suppose that (i) t
′
i is more
optimistic about Θ than ti; (ii) t
′
i is more optimistic that all players are more
optimistic about Θ than ti; (iii) t
′
i is more optimistic that all players are more
optimistic that all players are more optimistic about Θ than ti; and so on ad
infinitum. In such a case, we say that t
′
i is at least high as ti in the order of
common certainty of optimism. We formally define this as follows:
Definition 1. t
′
i is at least as high as ti in the order of common certainty of
optimism (denoted by t
′
i CCO ti) if hki (t′i) SD hki (ti) for each k ∈ N.
Using our alternative representation of first-order stochastic dominance (Propo-
sition 1), we mean by hki (t
′
i) SD hki (ti) that hki (t′i)[Y ] ≥ hki (ti)[Y ] for any Y ∈
U(Zki ), where Z
1
i = ∆(Θ) for k = 1 and Z
k
i = ∆(Θ× Z1−i × · · · × Zk−1−i ) for k ≥ 2.
In what follows, we often refer to this order CCO as the CCO order.
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2.3 Supermodular Games
The players in the set I play the following game. For each player i ∈ I, let Ai
denote his action space, and let ui : A×Θ→ R denote his payoff function, where
A =
∏
j∈I Aj. Recall that Θ is the payoff-relevant state space introduced in the
previous subsection.
Let X be a complete lattice and a partial order ≥. For each Y ⊆ X, let∨
Y ∈ X denote the least upper bound (“join”) of Y , and ∧Y ∈ X denote the
greatest lower bound (“meet”) of Y .19 That X is a complete lattice means that
the join and meet exist for any Y ⊆ X. In case Y is a binary set of the form {x, y}
with x, y ∈ X, following the standard notation, we denote its join by x∨ y and its
meet by x ∧ y.
We consider supermodular games based on Θ as a domain of games, defined as
follows. First, Ai is a complete lattice endowed with a partial order Ai . Second,
each ui(·) is supermodular on Ai and has increasing difference in both (ai, a−i)
and (ai, θ). That is, for each ai, a
′
i ∈ Ai, a−i, a′−i ∈ A−i, and θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, whenever
a−i A−i a′−i and θ) Θ,i θ′, it follows that
ui((a; θ) ∨ (a′; θ′)) + ui((a; θ) ∧ (a′; θ′)) ≥ ui(a; θ) + ui(a′; θ′),
or equivalently,
ui(ai ∨ a′i, a−i; θ) + ui(ai ∧ a′i, a′−i; θ′) ≥ ui(ai, a−i; θ) + ui(a′i, a′−i; θ′).
A tuple G = (I,Θ, (Ai, ui, Ti, pii)i∈I) comprises an (incomplete-information) su-
permodular game.
2.4 Equilibria
In an incomplete-information supermodular game G, we denote a pure strategy of
each player i by a Ti-measurable function σi : Ti → Ai. We first define a pure
strategy Bayesian equilibrium.
19z ∈ X is an upper (a lower) bound of Y ⊆ X if z  y (z  y) for all y ∈ Y . z ∈ X is the
least upper bound of Y ⊆ X if is an upper bound of Y , and moreover, we have z′  z for any
upper bound z′ of Y . Analogously, z ∈ X is the greatest lower bound of Y ⊆ X if is a lower
bound of Y , and moreover, we have z′  z for any lower bound z′ of Y .
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Definition 2. A strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈I is a (pure-strategy) Bayesian equi-
librium if, for each i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and ai ∈ Ai,∫
Θ×T−i
ui(σ
∗
i (ti), σ
∗
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[θ, t−i] ≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, σ
∗
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[θ, t−i].
Let Σ∗ denote the set of “all” Bayesian equilibria of an incomplete information
supermodular game G = (g, (Ti), (Ti), (pii))i∈I . It may well be the case that Σ∗ is
empty. The interested reader should be referred to Van Zandt and Vives (2007) for
a sufficient condition for Σ∗ to be nonempty.20 In what follows, we simply assume
that Σ∗ is nonempty.
We call σ ∈ Σ∗ the least equilibrium if, for each σ∗ ∈ Σ∗, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti,
we have σ∗i (ti) Ai σi(ti), and similarly, call σ¯ ∈ Σ∗ the greatest equilibrium if,
for each σ∗ ∈ Σ∗, i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti, we have σi(ti) Ai σ∗i (ti). As is usually the
case for monotone comparative statics, this paper focuses on the least and greatest
Bayesian equilibria in supermodular games. The following is our definition of
monotone comparative statics with respect to the CCO order.
Definition 3. We say that monotone comparative statics holds in a supermodular
game G with respect to the CCO order if, for each i ∈ I and ti, t′i ∈ Ti such that if
ti CCO t′i, we have σi(ti) Ai σi(t′i) and σi(ti) Ai σi(t′i).
3 Sufficiency for Monotone Comparative Statics
In this section, up to technical regularity conditions guaranteeing the existence
of the least and greatest equilibria, we show that monotone comparative statics
holds in any supermodular game G with respect to the common certainty of op-
timism (CCO) order. In what follows, we focus only on the least equilibrium of a
supermodular game G, because the logic for the greatest equilibrium is similar.
The key observation is that, for each type ti of each player i, his least equilibrium
action is characterized by his least interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) of
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007).
The least ICR is identified by iterative elimination of never best responses “from
below”. First, for each i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, let A0i (ti) = Ai and a0i (ti) =
∧
A0i (ti), and
20See also our Proposition 2 and Remark 1 right after the proposition.
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then, let
A1i (ti) = arg max
ai∈A0i (ti)
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpii(ti)[θ, t−i],
and a1i (ti) =
∧
A1i (ti). Later we assume that a
1
i (·) is a measurable mapping and
that A1i (ti) is a complete sublattice, which implies that a
1
i (ti) ∈ A1i (ti). Note
that, by supermodularity, any ai that does not satisfy ai Ai a1i (ti) is !!not a best
response against a−i(·)!!.
By an induction argument, for each k ≥ 1, for each i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, let
Ak+1i (ti) = arg max
ai∈Aki (ti)
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, a
k
−i(t−i); θ)dpii(ti)[θ, t−i],
and ak+1i (ti) =
∧
Ak+1i (ti). Again, later we assume that A
k+1
i (ti) is a complete
sublattice, implying that ak+1i (ti) ∈ Ak+1i (ti), and that ak+1i (·) is a measurable
mapping. Note that by supermodularity, any ai that does not satisfy ai Ai
ak+1i !!(ti)!! is !!not a best response against a
k
−i(·)!!.
Finally, for each i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, define
a∞i (ti) =
∨
{a1i (ti), a2i (ti), . . .}.
Since Ai is a complete lattice, we have a
∞
i (ti) ∈ Ai. Thus, if a∞i (ti) is a
best response to a∞−i(·) (given his belief pii(ti) over Θ × T−i), then σ defined by
σi(ti) = a
∞
i (ti) for each i ∈ I and ti constitutes an equilibrium. By construction, σ
must be the least equilibrium of the game, because in each step k of the induction,
any action ai that does not satisfy ai Ai aki (ti) is shown to be a never-best
response to the lowest selection of the others’ actions from Ak−1i (·), and hence, a
never-best response to any other strategy profile σ−i of the other players such that
σ−i(t−i) A−i ak−i(t−i). We note this result as a proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that, for each i, ti, and k ≥ 1, (i) Aki (ti) is a complete
sublattice, (ii) aki (·) =
∧
Aki (·) is a measurable mapping, and (iii) a∞i (ti) is a best
response to a∞−i(·). Then, σ defined by σi(ti) = a∞i (ti) for each i and ti constitutes
the least equilibrium.
Remark 1. Interested readers are referred to Van Zandt and Vives (2007) and Van
Zandt (2010) for more primitive assumptions on the environment that guarantee
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the existence of the least (and analogously, greatest) equilibrium. Specifically, they
assume that (i) Ai is a compact metric lattice;
21 (ii) ui is bounded, continuous in
ai and measurable in θ; and (iii) pii(·) is measurable (as a mapping from Ti to
∆(Θ× T−i)).
!!Takashi’s comment: For the sake of completeness, I will try to explicitly prove
that any action ai that does not satisfy ai Ai a1i (ti) is not a best response against
a0−i(·). The proof is essentially the same as part of the argument we used in the
proof of Theorem 1. If we take its contrapositive statement, what remains to show
is that ai is a best response to a
0
−i(·) implies that ai Ai a1i (ti). By supermodularity
on Ai, we have that for any θ and a−i,
ui(ai ∨ a1i (ti), a−i, θ)− ui(a1i (ti), a−i, θ) ≥ ui(ai, a−i, θ)− ui(ai ∧ a1i (ti), a−i, θ).
This further implies∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai ∨ ai(ti), a0−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti), a
0
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]
≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, a
0
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai ∧ a1i (ti), a0−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]. (∗)
Assume that ai is a best response to a
0
−i(·). Then, we have∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, a
0
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai∧ai(ti), a0−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i] ≥ 0. (∗∗)
Then, plugging (∗∗) into (∗), we obtain∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai∨a1i (ti), a0−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti), a
0
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i] ≥ 0.
Thus, since a1i (ti) ∈ Ai(ti), we have that ai ∨ a1i (ti) ∈ A1i (ti). This implies∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai∨a1i (ti), a0−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti), a
0
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i] = 0. (∗∗∗)
21Compactness is used not for existence of best replies (thanks to the supermodularity), but
for guaranteeing that aki (·) is a measurable mapping. For this point, see Footnote 3 of Van Zandt
(2010) who mentions that compactness can be replaced by sigma-compactness for this measurable
selection argument.
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Plugging (∗ ∗ ∗) into (∗), we obtain∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai ∧ a1i (ti), a0−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i] ≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, a
0
−i(t−i), θ)dpii(ti)[t−i]
Since ai is assumed to be a best response against a
0
−i(·), we have that ai ∧ a1i (ti) ∈
A1i (ti). In sum, we conclude that ai, ai ∨ a1i (ti), ai ∧ a1i (ti) ∈ A1i (ti). Taking into
account a1i (ti) ∈
∧
A1i (ti), we have ai Ai a1i (ti).!!
Now we prove that monotone comparative statics holds in any supermodular
game G with respect to the CCO order.
Theorem 1. Let G = (g, (Ti), (Ti), (pii))i∈I be an incomplete information super-
modular game that satisfies (as in Proposition 2): for each i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and
k ≥ 1, (i) Aki (ti) is a complete sublattice; (ii) aki (·) =
∧
Aki (·) is a measurable
mapping; and (iii) a∞i (ti) is a best response to a
∞
−i. Let ti and t
′
i be two types of
player i such that t
′
i CCO ti. Then, for the least equilibrium of the game G, σ, we
have σi(t
′
i) Ai σi(ti).
Proof. In the previous proposition, we show that the least equilibrium is fully char-
acterized by the iterated elimination of never-best responses of interim correlated
rationalizability “from below.” Thus, it suffices to show that, for each i ∈ I, k ≥ 1,
and ti, t
′
i such that ti CCO t′i, we have aki (ti) Ai aki (t′i).
First, because a1i (ti) ∈ A1i (ti) and a1i (t′i) ∈ A1i (t′i), we have∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (t
′
i), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i] ≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti)∨a1i (t
′
i), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i]
and∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i] ≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti)∧a1i (t
′
i), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i]
Since h1i (t
′
i) SD h1i (ti) and a0−i(t−i) does not depend on t−i, the distribution
over Θ × A−i induced by pii(t′i) first-order stochastically dominates that induced
by pii(ti). Therefore, by the supermodularity of the game, we have∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti) ∨ a1i (t
′
i), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (t
′
i), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i]
≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
1
i (ti) ∧ a1i (t
′
i), a
0
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i].
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Because the left-hand side of the above inequality is nonpositive and the right-
hand side is nonnegative, we must have both equal to zero. In particular, this
implies that a1i (ti) ∧ a1i (t′i) ∈ A1i (ti). However, because a1i (ti) =
∧
A1i (ti) ∈ A1i (ti),
we must have a1i (t
′
i) Ai a1i (ti).
We move on to the next step. Let
A2i (ti) = arg max
ai∈A1i (ti)
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(ai, a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpii(ti)[θ, t−i],
and a2i (ti) =
∧
A2i (ti). Again, we assume that A
2
i (ti) is a complete sublattice,
implying that a2i (ti), and that a
2
i (·) is a measurable mapping.
It follows from supermodularity that any ai that does not satisfy ai Ai a2i (ti)
does not survive the iterative elimination of never-best responses. Recall that for
any j 6= i and tj, t′j, if h1j(t′j) SD h1j(tj), then a1j(t′j) Aj a1j(tj). Since we assume
that t
′
i CCO ti, we also have h2i (t′i) SD h2i (ti). Define
Y˜ =
{
(θ, a1−i) ∈ Θ× A−i
∣∣∣ ∃(θˆ, tˆ−i) s.t. θ Θ,i θˆ, a1−i Ai a1−i(tˆ−i))} .
Clearly, Y˜ ∈ U(Θ×A−i) where U(Θ×A−i) denotes the set of all upper events of
Θ×A−i. By Lemma 1, we can conclude that the weight h2i (t′i) assigns to the event
Y˜ is at least as high as the weight h2i (ti) does.
Due to the definition of a2i (ti) ∈ A2i (ti) and a2i (t′i) ∈ A2i (t′i), we have∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (t
′
i), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i] ≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (ti)∨a2i (t
′
i), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i],
and∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (ti), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i] ≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (ti)∧a2i (t
′
i), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i].
Since h2i (t
′
i) SD h2i (ti), by the supermodularity of the game, we have∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (ti) ∨ a2i (t
′
i), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (t
′
i), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(t
′
i)[θ, t−i]
≥
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (ti), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i]−
∫
Θ×T−i
ui(a
2
i (ti) ∧ a2i (t
′
i), a
1
−i(t−i); θ)dpi(ti)[θ, t−i].
Because the left-hand side of the above inequality is nonpositive and the right-
hand side is nonnegative, we must have both equal to zero. In particular, this
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implies that a2i (ti) ∧ a2i (t′i) ∈ A2i (ti). However, because a2i (ti) =
∧
A2i (ti) ∈ A2i (ti),
we must have a2i (t
′
i) Ai a2i (ti).
By an induction argument, we can analogously show that aki (t
′
i) Ai aki (ti) for
each k ∈ N, which implies that a∞i (t′i) Ai a∞i (ti).
Since the least equilibrium σ is defined as σi(ti) = a
∞
i (ti) for every i ∈ I and
ti, we complete the proof.
4 Necessity for Monotone Comparative Statics:
The Single Person Case
In this section, common certainty of optimism (CCO) is shown to be a necessary
condition for monotone comparative statics to be valid in all supermodular games.
We show this by constructing a specific supermodular game, which we call an
optimism-elicitation game, which satisfies the following: for each player i and his
types ti and t
′
i, if we do not have ti CCO t′i, then for the least equilibrium of
this optimism-elicitation game, denoted by σ, we do not have σi(ti) Ai σi(t′i).
Together with the previous theorem, we thus conclude that the CCO order is nec-
essary and sufficient for monotone comparative statics in all supermodular games.
4.1 A Single-Person Game
We first consider the single-person environment to explain the key technical issue
and the main intuition how we treat it. The restriction to the single-person case
simplifies our analysis significantly because there is no need to consider interactive
beliefs so that we lose nothing to focus on the first-order beliefs only. Thus, a
naive candidate for our optimism-elicitation game is a so-called scoring rule, which
is essentially a single-person decision problem where the decision maker reveals
his belief over Θ (and his payoff function is such that the truthful revelation is
uniquely optimal). That is, his action space is the set of all probability measures
over Θ. Monotone comparative statics is obtained in a straightforward manner by
endowing this action space with a partial order based on the first-order stochastic
dominance.
However, as we observe in the next example, this decision problem is not a
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(single-person) supermodular game, because the action space, ∆(Θ), is not a lat-
tice, even if the parameter space Θ itself is. This means that we need a more careful
choice of the action space. To illustrate this point, we go through the following
example.
Example 1 (Kamae, Krengel, and O’Brien (1977)). 22
Let Θ = {0, 1}2, and Θ,1=Θ,2 denote its component-wise partial order. Con-
sider two probability measures P, P ′ ∈ ∆(Θ) such that P (0, 0) = P (1, 1) = 1/2
and P ′(1, 0) = P ′(0, 1) = 1/2. Then, two probability measures Q,Q′ ∈ ∆(Θ) are
upper bounds of {P, P ′}: Q(1, 0) = Q(1, 1) = 1/2 and Q′(0, 1) = Q′(1, 1) = 1/2.
Suppose that there exists a least upper bound Q′′. Then, we have Q′′(1, 1) = 1/2
because we need P (1, 1) ≤ Q′′(1, 1) ≤ Q(1, 1). Moreover, we have Q′′(0, 1) = 0 (or
Q′′(0, 1) +Q′′(1, 1) = 1/2) because we need Q′′(0, 1) +Q′′(1, 1) ≤ Q(0, 1) +Q(1, 1).
Similarly, we have Q′′(1, 0) = 0. However, then, such Q′′ is equivalent to P , which
does not first-order dominate P ′. This contradicts that Q′′ is an upper bound of
{P, P ′}.
Therefore, if we consider (the single-person version of) the optimism-elicitation
game where an individual chooses his probability measure over Θ, the correspond-
ing game, no matter how we define it, is “not” a supermodular game because his
action space, the set of all probability measures over Θ (endowed with a stochastic
dominance partial order), does not constitute a lattice.
The problem illustrated in the above example is that the set of all probability
distributions (over Θ) is not closed in the meet and join operators. To elaborate
on this point, we revisit the same example.
Example 2. We consider the same example as above, but now the agent chooses
a function
α : U(Θ)→ [0, 1],
where U(Θ) ⊆ 2Θ denotes the set of all subsets of Θ that are upper sets (recall
that Y ⊆ Θ is an upper set if [x ∈ Y and y ≥ x] implies y ∈ Y ). In the current
22To be rigorous, it is a slightly different example from the one provided there, but essentially
the same.
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context, we have
U(Θ) =
{
∅, {(1, 1)}, {(0, 1), (1, 1)}, {(1, 0), (1, 1)},
{(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Θ
}
.
We may interpret each α(Θ) as the agent’s “belief” regarding the event Θ, and
in fact, each belief corresponds to some mapping α.23 However, other α may not
correspond to any probability measure. For example, let α be defined in such a
way that, for each Y ∈ U(Θ),
α(Y ) = max{P (Y ), P ′(Y )}.
That is,
α(Y ) =

0 if Y = ∅
1/2 if Y = {(1, 1)}, {(0, 1), (1, 1)}, {(1, 0), (1, 1)}, and
1 otherwise.
If it corresponds to a probability measure Q∗ over Θ, then α({1, 1}) = 1/2 implies
Q∗(1, 1) = 1/2, which, together with α({(0, 1), (1, 1)}) = α({(1, 0), (1, 1)}) = 1/2,
implies Q∗(0, 1) = Q∗(1, 0) = 0. However, α({(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}) = 1 implies
that Q∗(0, 1) + Q∗(1, 0) = 1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, this α does not
correspond to any probability measure.
Consider a “modified” optimism-elicitation game with a single player who
chooses any α : U(Θ) → [0, 1]. Let A∗ denote the set of all such α. The
player has a strictly larger strategy space than in the original optimism-elicitation
game because some “non-additive” measures are allowed. Moreover, A∗ is now
a lattice (associated with the first-order stochastic dominance partial order), be-
cause, for any α, α′, we have α′′, α′′′ such that α′′(Y ) = max{α(Y ), α′(Y )} and
α′′′(Y ) = min{α(X), α′(Y )} for any Y ∈ U(Θ). In fact, it is even a complete
lattice, because for any nonempty subset A ⊆ A∗, there are α′, α′′ ∈ A∗ such that
α′(Y ) = supα∈A α(Y ) and α
′′(Y ) = infα∈A α(Y ) for any Y ∈ U(Θ).
23For example, P in the previous example is equivalent to αP such that (i) α(∅) = 0, (ii)
αP (Y ) = 1/2 for any nonempty Y ∈ U(Θ) with (0, 0) /∈ Y , and (iii) αP (Y ) = 1 for any
Y ∈ U(Θ) with (0, 0) ∈ Y .
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The key for the construction of our optimism-elicitation game is two-fold. First,
the action space of our game is based on non-additive beliefs such as α discussed
above,24 in order to make it a complete lattice. Second, as we see below in the
formal construction, the action space of our game essentially comprises only count-
ably many “test sets” to (partially) identify the agent’s belief. We explain these
features more in detail after formally introducing our optimism-elicitation game.
Formally, the optimism-elicitation game for the single agent case is defined as
follows: (i) the agent chooses an action β : F (Θ0) × Q+ → [0, 1] (recall that Θ0
denotes the countable dense subset of Θ where Assumption 1 is satisfied) where
• F (Θ0) denotes the set of all finite subsets of Θ0,
• Q+ denotes the set of nonnegative rational numbers, and
• β is nondecreasing (i.e., for any (γ, q) and (γ′, q′) with clup(Bq(γ)) ⊆ clup(Bq′(γ′)),
we have β(γ, q) ≤ β(γ′, q′))
and (ii) given any realization θ ∈ Θ, the agent’s payoff is given:
u(β, θ) =
∑
(γ,q)∈F (Θ0)×Q+
[
β(γ, q)I{clup(Bq(γ))}(θ)−
β(γ, q)2
2
]
µ(γ, q),
where
• Bq(γ) =
⋃
y∈γ Bq(y);
• µ is a full-support distribution over a countable set F (Θ0)×Q+25; and
• The indicator function is defined as:
I{clup(Bq(γ))}(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ clup(Bq(γ))
0 otherwise.
Let
B = {β : F (Θ0)×Q+ → [0, 1]∣∣β is nonderecasing}
24See Schmeideler (1986, 1989) for non-additive beliefs or capacities in decision theory.
25We can set h : F (Θ0)×Q+ → N as an injection mapping because F (Θ0)×Q+ is countable.
Specifically, we define the full-support distribution µ by µ(γ, q) = (1/2)h(γ,q) > 0.
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denote the space of the agent’s strategies. Note that B constitutes the set of
capacities (i.e., non-additive measures) for closed upper sets generated by F (Θ0)×
Q+.26 A capacity is often considered as a natural generalization of a probability
measure.27 In addition, the space of capacities has an advantageous feature that
it is a complete lattice.
As we mention above, another feature of our construction is that the action
space of our game essentially comprises only countably many “test sets” to (par-
tially) identify the agent’s belief. Countability enables us to have a full-support
distribution over the test sets, which makes the agent’s incentive to tell the truth
strict (and hence, the optimal decision is unique).28
Indeed, if a player has a belief b ∈ ∆(Θ) over Θ,29 then his unique optimal
action is β∗(b) : F (Θ0)×Q+ → [0, 1] such that
β∗(γ, q|b) = b(clup(Bq(γ)))
for each (γ, q) ∈ F (Θ0)×Q+.
Endowing B with a natural product order, we show that the game is a super-
modular game. First, we claim that B is a complete lattice: for each C ⊆ B, define
two functions,
∨
(C) and
∧
(C), so that∨
(C)(γ, q) = sup
β∈C
β(γ, q),∧
(C)(γ, q) = inf
β∈C
β(γ, q),
26A capacity is usually defined as a monotone set function as above, but with additional
normalization conditions that it assigns probability zero (one) on the null (entire) set. Redefining
B by adding these normalization conditions does not essentially change our arguments, and hence,
we adopt the current definition to simplify the notation. Indeed, it should be clear that any type
of any agent should find it optimal to set β(γ, q) = 0 (1) if clup(Bq(γ)) = ∅ (Θ). In this sense,
the definition above is without loss of generality. The same comment applies to the definitions
of Bm and B∞ in Section 5.1.
27See Schmeidler (1986, 1989) for more details on capacities.
28Moreover, as we see in Section 5 to extend this construction to the case of multiple players,
this countability plays another crucial role. There, we consider the “higher-order belief” version
of the current construction as each player’s action space (in order to elicit his belief hierarchy),
and countability at each level of hierarchy (and certain continuity) is crucial to make the next
level of hierarchy (and hence at any level of hierarchy) stay countable.
29Recall that ∆(Θ) denotes the set of all probability measures over Θ.
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which makes both
∨
(C) and
∧
(C) elements of B, because they both take values
in [0, 1] for any (γ, q), and they are both monotonic. Suppose, on the contrary,
that
∨
(C) is not monotonic for some C. Then, there exist (γ, q), (γ′, q′) such that
clup(Bq(γ)) ⊆ clup(Bq′(γ′)) and
∨
(C)(γ, q) >
∨
(C)(γ′, q′). By definition, there
exists β ∈ C such that β(γ, q) is close to ∨(C)(γ, q), and in particular, β(γ, q) >∨
(C)(γ′, q′) ≥ β(γ′, q′). This contradicts the hypothesis that β is monotonic.
Second, the payoff function u(·) is supermodular on B and has increasing dif-
ference in (β, x): for any β, β′ ∈ B, x, x′ ∈ Θ with x ≥ x′, we have
u(β ∨ β′, x)− u(β, x) + u(β ∧ β′, x′)− u(β′, x′)
=
∫
(γ,q):β′(γ,q)>β(γ,q)
[
(β′(γ, q)− β(γ, q))I{clup(Bq(γ))}(x)− β′(γ, q)2 + β(γ, q)2
]
dµ
−
∫
(γ,q):β′(γ,q)>β(γ,q)
[
(β(γ, q)− β′(γ, q))I{clup(Bq(γ))}(x
′
)− β(γ, q)2 + β′(γ, q)2
]
dµ
=
∫
(γ,q):β′(γ,q)>β(γ,q)
[
(β′(γ, q)− β(γ, q))I{clup(Bq(γ))}(x)(1− I{clup(Bq(γ))}(x
′
))
]
dµ
≥ 0.
We now examine monotone comparative statics for this supermodular game.
The first result establishes the sufficiency of first-order stochastic dominance for
monotone comparative statics in this supermodular game (as should be expected).
Proposition 3. Let b, b′ ∈ ∆(Θ). If b′ first-order stochastically dominates b, then,
for any (γ, q) ∈ F (Θ0)×Q+, we have β∗(γ, q|b′) ≥ β∗(γ, q|b).
Proof. While it is a corollary to Theorem 1, the proof is also straightforward once
we notice that β∗(γ, q|b) = b(clup(Bq(γ))) and β∗(γ, q|b′) = b′(clup(Bq(γ))).
Next, we show the desired necessity of first-order dominance for monotone
comparative statics in this supermodular game.
Proposition 4. Let b, b′ ∈ ∆(Θ). If β∗(γ, q|b′) ≥B β∗(γ, q|b) for each (γ, q) ∈
F (Θ0)×Q+, then b′ SD b.
Proof. We take the contrapositive of the statement. Then what we want to show is
that if b′ does “not” stochastically dominate b, then β∗(γ, q|b′) “cannot” be higher
than β∗(γ, q|b) in the sense of the partial order on B. Thus, the rest of the proof
is completed by the following lemma.
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Lemma 2. Let b, b′ ∈ ∆(Θ). If b′ does not first-order stochastically dominate b,
then there exists (γ, q) ∈ F (Θ0)×Q+ such that β∗(γ, q|b) > β∗(γ, q|b′).
Proof. We relegate the proof to the Appendix.
With this lemma, we complete the proof of Proposition 4.
4.2 Properties of B
Recall the definition of B = {β : F (Θ0)×Q+ → [0, 1]| β is nonderecasing}. Let
B = {β : F (Θ0) × Q+ → [0, 1]} be the superset of B in which we only drop the
property that β is nondecreasing from B. In this subsection, we first introduce a
metric for B, inducing a topology with respect to which B is shown to be a compact
metric space. Second, we claim that B is a closed subset of B so that B is also
a compact metric space. Note that every compact metric space is complete and
separable. Thus, B has a countable dense subset B0. Finally, we will establish
that B possesses its closed partial order, and satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 (with
replacement of X by B and X0 with B0 in the statements). These properties are
exploited in the next section when we consider the multi-player case.
First, we introduce a norm over B to make it a subspace of a normed space
(and accordingly, its metric is induced by this norm).30 For each β ∈ B, its norm
is given by
‖β‖ =
∑
(γ,q)∈F (Θ0)×Q+
|β(γ, q)|µ(γ, q),
where µ is a full-support probability distribution over F (Θ0) × Q+ such that we
set h : F (Θ0) × Q+ → N as an injection map and µ(γ, q) = (1/2)h(γ,q) for each
(γ, q) ∈ F (Θ0)×Q. Because β(γ, q) ∈ [0, 1] for any (γ, q), we have ‖β‖ ∈ [0, 1] for
any β ∈ B.
Lemma 3. B is a compact metric space.
30A standard topology for the set of probability distributions is a weak∗-topology (e.g., Bran-
denburger and Dekel (1993)), but note that B is not a set of probability distributions. In partic-
ular, some β ∈ B does not necessarily correspond to any probability measure over Θ. The norm
above and its induced topology on B are well-defined despite this “non-probabilistic” nature of
B. The same comment applies when we discuss the objects like Bm and B∞ later in Section 5.1.
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Proof. We relegate the proof to the Appendix.
Remark 2. The lemma implies that B is a separable and complete metric space.
Next, we show that B satisfies Assumption 1. First, for each K ∈ N, we define
B1,K ⊆ B as follows: β ∈ B1,K if and only if there exists a K-element subset of Θ0,
say XK = {x1 . . . , xK} ∈ F (Θ0), such that for any (γ, q) ∈ F (Θ0)×Q+, we have
β(γ, q) =
{
minq′∈QK β(XK ∩ γ, q′) sub. to Bq′(XK ∩ γ) ⊇ Bq(γ) if XK ∩ γ 6= ∅,
1 if XK ∩ γ = ∅.
where QK = { kK |k = 0, 1, . . . , K}.
Note that such β is fully identified by (β(X˜, q))X˜⊆XK ,q∈QK . This implies that
B1,K contains countably many elements, and thus B0 =
⋃
K∈N B1,K contains count-
ably many elements. The next lemma shows that Assumption 1 is satisfied for B,
where in the statement, X is replaced by B and X0 is replaced by B0.
Lemma 4. For any β ∈ B and ε > 0, there exists β0 ∈ B0 such that ‖β0 − β‖ < ε
and β0 ≥ β.
Proof. We relegate the proof to the Appendix.
The next lemma shows that Assumption 2 is also satisfied for B.
Lemma 5. For each C ⊆ B and ε > 0, there exists δ(C, ε) > 0 such that, for any
D ⊆ B with d(C,D) < δ(C, ε), we have d(up(C), up(D)) < ε.
Proof. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Finally, we show that the partial order on B is a closed partial order.
Lemma 6. Let B be endowed with a natural product order ≥B. Then, ≥B is a
closed order.
Proof. Consider two sequences {βn} and {β′n} in B, such that βn → β and β′n → β′
as n→∞. Then, due to the continuity of β and β ′ , for each (γ, q) ∈ F (X0)×Q+,
we have βn(γ, q) → β(γ, q) and β′n(γ, q) → β′(γ, q) as n → ∞. Now suppose that
βn(γ, q) ≥B β′n(γ, q) for any n. Then, we must have β(γ, q) ≥B β′(γ, q) for each
(γ, q). This means that the partial order on B is a closed partial order.
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5 Necessity for Monotone Comparative Statics:
The Multi-Player Case
With multiple agents, we need an optimism-elicitation game where the equilibrium
reflects each player’s belief hierarchy (not only his first-order belief). Although one
may think that the situation becomes prohibitively more complicated, we show in
this section that the same technique as in the single-person case can be extended
appropriately.
The goal of this section is to construct a (multi-player) supermodular game
such that common certainty of optimism holds if and only if monotone comparative
statics holds in this game (Theorem 2 in Section 5.2). The crucial step is where
the construction of each player’s action space where each player bets not only on
the realization of θ ∈ Θ but also on each other’s betting behavior, reflecting his
high-order beliefs (Section 5.1).
5.1 Preliminary
Let X1 = Θ, X10 = Θ0, and B1 = B. For m ≥ 2, we inductively construct super-
modular games where each player’s m-th order belief is relevant. Specifically, for
m ≥ 2, assume that (i) Xm−1 is a separable, complete metric space with a count-
able dense subset Xm−10 , (ii) X
m−1 satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 (with replacement
of X by Xm−1 and X0 by Xm−10 in the statements) with the corresponding closed
partial order, (iii) Bm−1 is a compact metric space with a countable dense subset
Bm−10 , and (iv) Bm−1 satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 (with replacement of X by
Bm−1 and X0 by Bm−10 in the statements) with the corresponding closed partial
order.31
We define Xm = Xm−1× (Bm−1)I−1, endowed with product topology and prod-
uct, closed partial order. Because both Xm−1 and Bm−1 are separable, complete
metric spaces and satisfy Assumption 1 and 2, Xm also satisfies the same proper-
ties:
Lemma 7. Xm is a separable, complete metric space with a countable dense subset
31Note that the corresponding partial orders vary across players. Although those sets, for-
mally speaking, vary with i, we omit the i-subscript for brevity. The same comment applies to
Xm,Bm, X∞,B∞ below.
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Xm0 such that Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied with replacement of X by X
m and
X0 by X
m
0 in the statements and X
m is a closed order.
Next, we define
Bm =
{
β : F (Xm0 )×Q+ → [0, 1]
∣∣∣ β is nonderecasing } .
Then, applying the same logic in Section 4.2, we obtain the following (the proof
omitted):
Lemma 8. Bm is a compact metric space with a countable dense subset Bm0 such
that Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied with replacement of X by Bm and X0 by Bm0
in the statements.
Therefore, for any m ≥ 1, (i)-(iv) are satisfied: (i) Xm is a separable, complete
metric space with a countable dense subset Xm0 , (ii) X
m satisfies Assumption 1
and 2 (with replacement of X by Xm and X0 by X
m
0 in the statements) with
the corresponding closed partial order, (iii) Bm is a compact metric space with
a countable dense subset Bm0 , and (iv) Bm satisfies Assumption 1 and 2 (with
replacement of X by Bm and X0 by Bm0 in the statements) with the corresponding
closed partial order.
Finally, let X∞ =
∏∞
m=1X
m. Then, we obtain the analogous properties for
X∞.
Lemma 9. X∞ is a separable, complete metric space with a countable dense
subset X∞0 such that Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied with replacement of X by
X∞ and X0 by X∞0 in the statements.
Similarly, let
B∞ =
{
β : F (X∞0 )×Q+ → [0, 1]
∣∣∣ β is nonderecasing } ,
and we obtain the following analogous properties for B∞.
Lemma 10. B∞ is a compact metric space with a countable dense subset B∞0 such
that Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied with replacement of X by B∞ and X0 by
B∞0 in the statements.
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5.2 Optimism-Elicitation Game: The Multi-Player Case
Now we show that the necessity of the CCO order for monotone comparative
statics.
Theorem 2. There is a supermodular game with the property that, for any player
i ∈ I and two types ti, t′i, we have that t′i CCO ti if and only if σi(t′i) Ai σi(ti),
where σ is the least equilibrium of this supermodular game.32
Proof. We construct an optimism-elicitation game such that: (i) each player i
chooses an action from Bi = B∞ and (ii) given any realization x ∈ X∞ and action
β ∈ Bi, each player i’s payoff is given:
ui(β, x) =
∑
(γ,q)∈F (X∞0 )×Q+
[ ∞∑
m=1
δm−1
{
β(γ, q)Im{clup(Bq(γ))}(x)−
β(γ, q)2
2
}]
µ(γ, q),
where
• 0 < δ < 1;
• Bq(γ) =
⋃
y∈γ Bq(y);
• µ is a full-support distribution over a countable set F (X∞0 )×Q+33; and
• The indicator function is defined as:
Im{clup(Bq(γ))}(x) =
{
1 if xm ∈ clup(Bq(γ)) ∩Xm
0 otherwise,
where xm denotes the truncation of x to Xm.
We can establish the following result by mimicking the argument for the case
of single-person optimism-elicitation game. So, we only state the result.
Lemma 11. We obtain the following results:
1. Bi is a complete lattice;
32To be more precise, what we show here is that for any parameter space Θ, there is a super-
modular game based on Θ with the desired property.
33We can set h : F (X∞0 )×Q+ → N as an injection mapping because F (X∞0 )×Q+ is countable.
Specifically, we define the full-support distribution µ by µ(γ, q) = (1/2)h(γ,q) > 0.
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2. u(·) is supermodular on Bi; and
3. u(·) has increasing difference in (β, x).
Therefore, the game constructed above is indeed a supermodular game. The
proposition below shows that player i reveals his probability assessment for each
upper event (those generated by F (X∞0 × Q+)) truthfully in this game, as his
unique ICR action.
Proposition 5. For each player i with type ti, we have A
∞
i (ti) = {β∗}, where for
each m ∈ N and each (γ, q) ∈ F (Xm0 )×Q+, we have
β∗(γ, q) = hm(ti)[clup(Bq(γ))],
where hm(ti) is ti’s belief on X
m.
Proof. We relegate the proof to the Appendix.
This means that “any” interim correlated rationalizable strategy of each player
i induces his true belief about any upper event U(X∞). We now examine mono-
tone comparative statics for this supermodular game. The first result shows the
sufficiency for monotone comparative statics in this supermodular game (as should
be expected).
Proposition 6. For each i and ti, t
′
i such that t
′
i CCO ti, we have β′ Bi β where
β and β′ satisfy A∞i (ti) = {β} and A∞i (t′i) = {β′}, respectively.
Proof. While this is a corollary to Theorem 1, the proof is also straightforward
once we notice that, by Proposition 5, for each m ∈ N and (γ, q) ∈ F (X∞0 )×Q+,
we obtain
β(γ, q) = hm(ti)[clup(Bq(γ))] and β
′(γ, q) = hm(t′i)[clup(Bq(γ))].
Next, we show the desired necessity for monotone comparative statics in this
supermodular game.
Proposition 7. For each i and ti, t
′
i such that A
∞
i (ti) = {β} and A∞i (t′i) = {β′},
if β Bi β′, then t′i CCO ti.
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Proof. We take the contrapositive of the statement: if there is some m ∈ N
such that hm(t′i) does “not” stochastically dominate h
m(ti) (so that h
m(ti)[Y ] >
hm(t
′
i)[Y ] for some closed upper set Y ⊆ Xm), then β′ “cannot” be higher than β
in the sense of the partial order on Bi = B∞. This can be shown quite analogously
as in Lemma 2, by replacing (i) X by Xm; (ii) X0 by X
m
0 ; (iii) b with h
m(ti); and
(iv) b
′
with hm(t
′
i), respectively. This completes the proof.
Propositions 6 and 7 together complete the proof of Theorem 2.
6 Relation to Van Zandt and Vives (2007)
In this section, we discuss the relationship with Van Zandt and Vives (henceforth,
VZV, 2007). Both VZV and our paper attempt to represent the supermodular
games with a (possibly non-common-prior) general type space, and discuss mono-
tone comparative statics with respect to the orders on types. However, there are
several differences in these two approaches:
• VZV consider an implicit (Harsanyi) type space endowed with a partial or-
der and then introduce each type’s belief map that is consistent with those
implicitly given structures. On the other hand, our order on types is based
on belief hierarchies constructed from the fundamentals space Θ, and in this
sense, our order is based on the given order on Θ (rather than giving an order
directly on a type space).
• Both papers order types based on the first-order stochastic dominance re-
lation, but their formal relationship is not clear because they have different
constructions of type spaces and their orders.
• VZV and our paper make different assumptions on the primitives: We con-
sider a Polish space Θ so that each belief hierarchy is a Borel probability
measure on a Polish space (thanks to the universal-type-space construction
of Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)). VZV do not assume that their type
space is a topological space.
• These two papers consider somewhat different classes of games. We consider
a class of games where only θ is payoff-relevant information, and the play-
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ers’ (first and higher-order) beliefs are not directly payoff-relevant. In VZV,
however, the agents’ types can be directly payoff-relevant.
Despite those differences, both of the papers provide (their versions of) mono-
tone comparative statics. In this sense, it seems natural to conjecture that one
obtains some formal relationship between the two approaches. We formalize this
relationship as the following propositions. First, we show that the order on types
in VZV can be seen as our CCO order on types.
Proposition 8 (VZV ⇒ CCO). Fix an arbitrary supermodular game studied in
VZV. Recall that, in VZV, each player’s (Harsanyi) type space Ti is endowed with
an exogenously given partial order. Fix any player i and any pair of types ti and
tˆi such that ti is a higher type than tˆi in the sense of VZV (i.e., pi(ti) ∈ ∆(T−i)
first-order stochastically dominates pi(tˆi) ∈ ∆(T−i)).
Define Θ as Θ = T , endowed with the same partial order as that for T . Then,
ti is higher than tˆi in the sense of CCO.
Proof. By definition, bi = (b
1
i , b
2
i , . . .) is given as follows: for each i ∈ I and
θ˜ = (t˜i, t˜−i) ∈ Θ,
b1i (θ˜) =
{
pi(ti)[t˜−i] if t˜i = ti,
0 otherwise,
and inductively, for each k ≥ 1 and b˜k−i ∈ B1−i,
bk+1i (θ˜, b˜
k
−i) =
{
pi(ti)[t˜−i] if t˜i = ti, and b˜k−i = p−i(t˜−i) = (pj(t˜j))j 6=i,
0 otherwise.
Similarly, bˆi = (bˆ
1
i , bˆ
2
i , . . .) is given as follows: for each i ∈ I and θ˜ = (t˜i, t˜−i) ∈
Θ,
bˆ1i (θ˜) =
{
pi(tˆi)[t˜−i] if t˜i = tˆi,
0 otherwise,
and inductively, for each k ≥ 1 and b˜k−i ∈ B1−i,
bˆk+1i (θ˜, b˜
1
−i) =
{
pi(tˆi)[t˜−i] if t˜i = tˆi, and b˜k−i = p−i(t˜−i) = (pj(t˜j))j 6=i,
0 otherwise.
Then, we can prove that ti CCO tˆi inductively.
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In this sense, the CCO order is (weakly) finer than the VZV order, and hence it
admits (weakly) more comparative statics. One way to interpret this result is that
(modulo some technical differences mentioned above) the class of games considered
by VZV is a special case of our games where each player’s belief hierarchy is
degenerated in the above sense.
The next proposition shows that, conversely, the CCO order on types can be
interpreted as the VZV order on types.
Proposition 9 (CCO ⇒ VZV). Fix an arbitrary supermodular game studied in
our paper. Define T0 = Θ; Ti = T
∗
i for each i ∈ I, where T ∗i represents the
universal type space constructed based on Θ in the sense of Brandenberger and
Dekel (1993); and T =
∏I
i=0 Ti. For each i and his belief hierarchy bi ∈ T ∗i , let
pi(bi) ∈ ∆(T−i) be his belief map for T−i induced by bi.
Then, if bi ∈ T ∗i is a higher type than bˆi ∈ T ∗i in the CCO sense, then bi ∈ Ti
first-order stochastically dominates bˆi ∈ Ti in the VZV sense.
Proof. By construction of the universal type space, we have pi(bi) = bi = (b
1
i , b
2
i , . . .),
and therefore, the CCO order and the VZV order coincide.
Similarly to the previous proposition, one interpretation of this result is that
the class of games we consider is a special case of that considered by VZV, where
ti is not directly payoff-relevant.
7 Application
Although our contribution is primarily theoretical, we suggest an economic envi-
ronment where our results could be potentially useful. Consider a simple trading
game between two parties with pure common values. According to the celebrated
no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), when the initial allocation of the
goods is Pareto efficient (which is trivially satisfied with pure common values) and
the parties share a common belief about how the prices of the goods are determined
ex post, i.e., the rational expectations hypothesis is satisfied, they never trade ex
post. However, in practice, traders may enjoy heterogeneous beliefs about how the
prices of the goods are determined, and some traders may be systematically more
optimistic than others. More specifically, the rational expectations hypothesis may
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be violated. Such belief divergence may admit some possibility of trading. Then, a
natural question arises as to the relationship between belief divergence and volume
of (or possibility of) trading. We introduce a partial order with respect to the size
of belief divergence, and show that the corresponding CCO order admits monotone
comparative statics.
There are two traders, a seller (i = 1) and a buyer (i = 2). Let I = {1, 2}.
The seller has an asset whose common value is v ∈ R. Due to this common value
assumption, the initial allocation of the asset is trivially Pareto efficient. Each
trader decides to “enter a market” or not. Let Ai = {0, 1}, where ai ∈ Ai is the
indicator for i’s entrance. If he enters, he has to pay a fixed cost c > 0.34
Unless both traders enter, there is no trade. Thus, a trader’s payoff is −c if he
enters and there is no trade, and 0 if he does not. After both traders enter, we
assume that they trade the asset at price p ∈ R. Then, the seller’s (ex post) payoff
is p − v − c, and the buyer’s (ex post) payoff is v − p − c. Hence, their ex post
payoffs are given by the following matrix:
a2 = 1 a2 = 0
a1 = 1 (p− v − c, v − p− c) (−c, 0)
a1 = 0 (0,−c) (0, 0)
At the timing of the (simultaneous) entry decision, imagine that v and p could
be uncertain for the players. Let Θ = R2 represent the payoff-state space so that,
given θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, θi denotes i’s trading payoff. That is, θ1 = p − v and
θ2 = v− p. It is assumed to be common knowledge that θ1 + θ2 = 0 (i.e., the asset
has a pure common value), but the players may not agree on the exact value of θ1
(and hence that of θ2). Player i’s ex post payoff can be written as follows: for any
θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ and a ∈ {0, 1}2,
ui(a, θ) = θia1a2 − cai.
For each i ∈ I, we introduce a (natural) partial order Θ,i over Θ so that θ Θ,i θ′
if θi ≥ θ′i. Observe that the constructed game g = (I,
∏
i∈I Ai,Θ, (ui)i∈I) is a
(complete-information) supermodular game.
34We essentially obtain the same result if we make the cost of entry zero but instead assume
that the players are strictly risk averse.
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Let T = (T1, T2, b1, b2) denote a Harsanyi type space, where a measurable space
Ti denotes player i’s type set, and a measurable map bi : Ti → ∆(Θ×T−i) denotes
his belief map. We assume that, for any i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti,
bi(ti) [{θ ∈ Θ|θ1 + θ2 = 0} × T−i] = 1,
that is, it is common knowledge that the asset has a pure common value.
First, consider the case where the players share a common prior. That is, there
exists µ ∈ ∆(Θ×T1×T2) such that each i’s belief map bi is a system of conditional
probabilities induced by µ in the following sense: for all i ∈ I and measurable
events Θ˜ ⊆ Θ, T˜1 ⊆ T1, and T˜2 ⊆ T2, we have
µ(Θ˜× T˜1 × T˜2) =
∫
T˜i
bi(ti)
[
Θ˜× T˜−i
]
dµi(ti),
where µi ∈ ∆(Ti) is the marginal of µ on Ti.
Observation 1. The ex ante probability of trading is zero for any Bayesian (Nash)
equilibrium σ = (σi(ti))i∈I, ti∈Ti .
Proof. Suppose contrarily that the ex ante probability of trading is strictly positive
for some equilibrium σ. In what follows, we only consider the case where σ is a pure
strategy equilibrium, although the conclusion holds for mixed-strategy equilibria
as well.
Let Tˆi ⊆ Ti denote the set of all types of player i who plays ai = 1. Focus on
player i = 1. For any t1 ∈ Tˆ1, we have
E[θ1 ∈ Θ1|t ∈ {t1} × Tˆ2]− c ≥ 0,
which implies E[θ1|t ∈ Tˆ1 × Tˆ2] > 0. Similarly, we have E[θ2|t ∈ Tˆ1 × Tˆ2] > 0.
However, it clearly contradicts the pure-common-value assumption.
Next, imagine an alternative situation where the players enjoy heterogeneous
beliefs. For each player i ∈ I and types ti, t′i ∈ Ti, we write t′i CCO ti if hk(t′i) SD
hk(ti) for any k ∈ N. That is, t′i is more optimistic about θi than ti; t′i is more
optimistic that all players are more optimistic about θi than t
′
i, and so on, ad
infinitum.35
As a corollary to our Theorem 1, we establish monotone comparative statics
with respect to this partial order. We state the result without its proof.
35Recall that any type ti believes that θ1 + θ2 = 0 throughout the entire belief hierarchies.
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Corollary 1. If t
′
i CCO ti, then in the least and greatest equilibrium of the game,
player i with type t
′
i plays a higher action than with ti.
Recall that it is common knowledge that θ1 + θ2 = 0. Nevertheless, trade can
sometimes occur, because the players do not agree on the exact level of θ1(= −θ2).
The CCO order introduced in this paper captures the connection between the size
of the belief divergence and the trading probability.
8 Concluding Remark
In this paper, we introduce an order on types over a universal type space. We
consider it as a natural order in the sense that monotone comparative statics is
valid in a class of supermodular games with incomplete information. We fully
characterize this order in terms of common certainty of optimism, that is, type t
′
i
is higher than type ti if t
′
i is more optimistic about state than ti; more optimistic
that all players are more optimistic about state than ti; and so on ad infinitum.
First, we show that whenever the common certainty of optimism holds, monotone
comparative statics holds in all supermodular games. Second, as its converse,
we construct an “optimism-elicitation game” as a single supermodular game with
the property that whenever the common certainty of optimism fails, monotone
comparative statics fails.
Although our CCO order characterizes monotone comparative statics in any
supermodular game, in some cases, one may be more interested in a fixed super-
modular game. In such a case, the CCO order continues to be a sufficient condition
for monotone comparative statics of that game, but may not be necessary. That
is, monotone comparative statics may hold even between types which are not or-
dered in the CCO sense. To see this, we consider a simple example where there
are no strategic interactions. It is clearly a supermodular game. Imagine a pair
of types of player i, ti and t
′
i, such that the first-order belief of ti (over Θ) first-
order stochastically dominates t′i, while the second-order belief of ti does “not”
first-order stochastically dominates t′i. Then, ti and t
′
i are not ordered in the CCO
sense, but clearly ti plays a higher equilibrium action than t
′
i. More generally, in
any supermodular game that is solvable by R(<∞) rounds of iterative elimination
of strictly dominated strategies, only up to R-th order beliefs matter for monotone
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comparative statics. Hence, the CCO order is “too restrictive.”36
Establishing a possibly finer order on types that is both necessary and sufficient
for monotone comparative statics in a given supermodular game is interesting but
challenging. Although we leave it as a future research question, here we briefly
explain our conjecture, on which we are currently working.37 The basic idea is
to introduce “indifference” relations on types of each player as follows. Consider
the first round of elimination of never best responses. If we have a1i (ti) Ai a1i (t′i),
then we let ti 1i t′i.38 This order is richer than the first-order stochastic dominance
order: if ti first-order stochastically dominates t
′
i in terms of their first-order beliefs,
then we have ti 1i t′i, but the converse may not be true.
As the next step, if we have a2i (ti) Ai a2i (t′i), then we let ti 2i t′i. We conjecture
that this order is richer than the first-order stochastic dominance order: if ti first-
order stochastically dominates t′i in terms of their second-order beliefs, then we
have ti 2i t′i. If this logic goes through up to any level of iterative elimination,
then in the limit, we conjecture that this alternative order is (i) richer than the
CCO order; (ii) is implied by monotone comparative statics in this game; and (iii)
implies monotone comparative statics in this game.
9 Appendix
In this appendix, we provide all the omitted proofs from the main body of the
paper.
36On the other hand, suppose that a researcher who analyzes such a R(<∞)-round dominance
solvable game fears a possibility of misspecification or over-simplification of the game, so that
the “actual” environment is not R-round dominance solvable, although she is fine to assume
that the actual game is supermodular. In such cases, the CCO order would be a “safe” way
to introduce an order on types because monotone comparative statics holds uniformly in all
(supermodular) games. Similarly, the CCO order would be relevant if one considers a mechanism
design situation, where any game can be designed as long as it is supermodular. See Mathevet
(2010) for supermodular mechanism design.
37We thank Takashi Ui because this conjecture stems from a discussion with him.
38Technically, we may not be able to interpret 1i as a partial order because both ti 1i t′i and
ti 1i t′i are possible even if ti 6= t′i. In that case, we can interpret those types as equivalent (in
the sense of 1i ) and can consider a quotient space based on this equivalence class. Then, 1i is
a partial order on this quotient space.
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9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Let b, b
′ ∈ ∆(X). b (first-order) stochastically dominates b′ if
and only if, for any Y0 ⊆ X0, b(clup(Y0)) ≥ b′(clup(Y0)). In addition, b strictly
stochastically dominates b′ if and only if the inequality holds for any Y0 ⊆ X0 and
it is strict at least for some Y0 ⊆ X0.
Proof. (⇐) First, suppose that b does not stochastically dominate b′. Then, there
exists a closed upper set Y such that b(Y ) < b′(Y ). We show that, in such a case,
there exists Y0 ⊆ X0 such that clup(Y0) = Y . Then this implies that b(clup(Y0)) <
b′(clup(Y0)). To show this, we establish the following result:
Lemma 12. For any Y ⊆ X, up(Y ) ∩ X0 is dense in up(Y ), i.e., the closure of
up(Y )∩X0 is up(Y ). In particular, if Y is itself an upper set, then Y ∩X0 is dense
in Y .
Proof. Fix Y ⊆ X. The lemma is trivially true if up(Y ) is empty. So let us assume
not. Let y ∈ up(Y ). Then, by Assumption 1, for any ε > 0, there is x ∈ X0
such that x ≥ y (and hence x ∈ up(Y )) and x ∈ Bε(y). This shows that up(Y ) is
dense.
(⇒) Next, suppose that b stochastically dominates b′. Fix Y0 ⊆ X0. If clup(Y0) is
a closed upper set, then we have b(clup(Y0)) ≥ b′(clup(Y0)) by the previous lemma.
Since clup(Y0) is closed by definition, it remains to show in the next lemma that
clup(Y0) is an upper set, which completes the proof. In fact, we can further show
that, for any Y ⊆ X (not only for any Y0 ⊆ X0), clup(Y ) is a closed upper set,
which turns out to be useful later.
Lemma 13. For any Y ⊆ X, clup(Y ) is a closed upper set.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that clup(Y ) is not an upper set. Then, there
exist x ∈ clup(Y ) and y ≥ x such that y /∈ clup(Y ). Since clup(Y ) is closed, one
can find ε > 0 such that d(y, clup(Y )) ≥ ε.
By the previous lemma, up(Y )∩X0 is dense in up(Y ), and hence, up(Y )∩X0 is
dense in clup(Y ). Thus, for any δ > 0, there is z ∈ up(Y )∩X0 such that d(x, z) < δ.
By Assumption 2, we can set δ = δ(x, ε) so that we have d(up(x), up(z)) < ε.
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This contradicts our hypothesis that d(y, clup(Y )) ≥ ε because we can deduce the
following implication:
ε ≤ d(y, clup(Y ))
= inf
y0∈clup(Y )
d(y, y0)
≤ inf
y0∈up(z)
d(y, y0) (∵ up(z) ⊆ clup(Y ))
= d(y, up(z)) (due to the definition of the Hausdorff metric)
≤ sup
y′∈up(x)
d(y′, up(z)) (∵ y ∈ up(x))
≤ d(up(x), up(z)) (due to the definition of the Hausdorff metric)
< ε. (Contradiction!)
This completes the proof of Lemma 13.
With Lemmas 12 and 13, we thus complete the proof of Proposition 1.
9.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Let b, b′ ∈ ∆(Θ). If b′ does not first-order stochastically dominate b,
then there exists (γ, q) ∈ F (Θ0)×Q+ such that β∗(γ, q|b) > β∗(γ, q|b′).
Remark 3. Suppose that there exists some closed upper set Y ⊆ X such that
b(Y ) > b′(Y ). By Proposition 1, there exists some Y0 ⊆ X0 such that Y =
clup(Y0). If this Y0 is finite, i.e., Y0 ∈ F (X0), then we trivially have β∗(Y0, 0|b) >
β∗(Y0, 0|b′). Thus, the subtlety of the proof of Lemma 2 lies in the possibility that
Y0 is (countably) infinite.
Proof. Suppose that there exists some closed upper set Y ⊆ X such that b(Y ) >
b
′
(Y ). Then, we fix ε ∈ (0, (b(Y ) − b′(Y ))/2). First, by the “inner regularity”
property, there exist two compact sets Z1, Z2 ⊆ X such that b(Z1) ≥ 1 − ε and
b′(Z2) ≥ 1 − ε. Let Z = Z1 ∪ Z2. This Z is again compact, and we have that
b(Z) ≥ 1− ε and b′(Z) ≥ 1− ε.
Let {ηj}∞j=1 be a decreasing sequence such that ηj > 0 for each j ∈ N and
ηj → 0 as j →∞. For each j, define
δj =
δ(Y ∩ Z, ηj)
2
,
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where δ(Y ∩ Z, ηj) is given as δ(Y, ε) in Assumption 2. By construction, we have
that δj → 0 as j →∞.
Because Y is closed, Y ∩ Z is compact. Fix j ∈ N. Let {Bδj(x)}x∈Y ∩Z be
an open cover of Y ∩ Z. Since Y ∩ Z is compact, we can take a finite subcover
{Bδj(xn)}Njn=1 such that xn ∈ Y ∩ Z for each n = 1, . . . , Nj. Since X0 is dense in
X, for each n = 1, . . . Nj, we can take yn ∈ X0 so that yn ∈ Bδj(xn).
Define γj = {y1, . . . , yNj} ∈ F (X0). Then, for each n = 1, . . . , Nj, we have
d(yn, Bδj(xn)) < 2δj. This implies that B2δj(yn) ⊇ Bδj(xn). Therefore,
B2δj(γj) =
Nj⋃
n=1
B2δj(yn) ⊇
Nj⋃
n=1
Bδj(xn) ⊇ Y ∩ Z.
Define also
Dj =
∞⋃
k=j
B2δk(γk).
By construction, we observe that Dj ⊇ B2δj(γj) for each j ∈ N, and D1 ⊇
D2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Y ∩Z. Moreover, we have that d(Y ∩Z,Dj) < 2δj. Since Assumption
2 guarantees that the upper set correspondence is continuous with respect to the
Hausdorff metric, we obtain
d(clup(Y ∩ Z), clup(Dj)) = d(up(Y ∩ Z), up(Dj)) < ηj.
Fix x /∈ clup(Y ∩ Z) arbitrarily. Then, we have d(x, clup(Y ∩ Z)) > 0 because
clup(Y ∩Z) is closed. Let j(x) ∈ N be defined in such a way that d(x, clup(Y ∩Z)) ≥
ηj(x). Then we have that x /∈ clup(Dj) for any j ≥ j(x), implying that x /∈⋂∞
j=1 clup(Dj). Therefore, we have
⋂∞
j=1 clup(Dj) ⊆ clup(Y ∩Z). However, because
clup(Dj) ⊇ clup(Y ∩ Z) for any j ∈ N, we obtain
⋂∞
j=1 clup(Dj) = clup(Y ∩ Z).
Thus, we have limj→∞ b(clup(Dj)) = b(clup(Y ∩ Z)).
Now, recall that, for each j ∈ N,
clup(Y ∩ Z) ⊆ clup(B2δj(γj)) ⊆ clup(Dj),
and thus,
b(clup(B2δj(γj))) ∈ [b(clup(Y ∩ Z)), b(clup(Dj))],
b′(clup(B2δj(γj))) ∈ [b′(clup(Y ∩ Z)), b′(clup(Dj))].
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Regarding b′, first observe that
lim
j→∞
b′(clup(B2δj(γj))) = b
′(clup(Y ∩ Z)).
Thus, by our hypothesis, there must exist J ∈ N such that b′(clup(B2δJ (γJ))) ≤
b′(clup(Y ∩ Z)) + ε. Define γ = γJ ∈ F (X0) and q ∈ Q+ such that q ∈ (0, 2δJ ].
Then, we deduce the following implication:
β∗(γ, q|b′) = b′(clup(Bq(γ))) (by the optimality of β∗ given b′)
≤ b′(clup(Y ∩ Z)) + ε (by our hypothesized inequality)
≤ b′(clup(Y )) + ε (∵ Y ∩ Z ⊆ Y )
= b′(Y ) + ε (∵ Y is a closed upper set).
Regarding b, we have
β∗(γ, q|b) = b(clup(Bq(γ))) (by the optimality of β∗ given b)
≥ b(clup(Y ∩ Z)) (∵ clup(Y ∩ Z) ⊆ clup(Bq(γ)))
≥ b(Y )− ε,
where the last inequality is obtained because
b(Y ) = b(Y ∩ Z) + b(Y \ Z) (∵ b is a probability measure)
≤ b(clup(Y ∩ Z)) + ε
(∵ Y ∩ Z ⊆ clup(Y ∩ Z) and b(Z) ≥ 1− ε⇒ b(Y/Z) ≤ ε).
Because 0 < ε < (b(Y )−b′(Y ))/2, we conclude that β∗(γ, q|b) > β∗(γ, q|b′).
9.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3: B is a compact metric space.
Proof. Since B is made isomorphic to Hilbert cube, we confirm that B is a compact
metric space. Thus, it suffices to show that B is a closed subset of B. Therefore,
our task here reduces to showing that B\B is open. Fix β ∈ B\B arbitrarily. Then,
we know that there exist (γ′, q′), (γ′′, q′′) ∈ F (X0)×Q+ such that clup(Bq′ (γ′)) ⊆
clup(Bq′′ (γ
′′)) and β(γ′, q′) > β(γ′′, q′′). What we want to show is that there exists
an open ball containing β that does not intersect with B.
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Define
ε = (β(γ′, q′)− β(γ′′, q′′)) min{µ(γ′, q′), µ(γ′′, q′′)}.
By our hypothesis, we have ε > 0. It then suffices to show that an open ball
Bε(β) = {β′ ∈ B|‖β − β′‖ < ε} does not intersect with B. Suppose, on the
contrary, that there is β′ ∈ Bε(β) ∩ B. Then,
‖β − β′‖ =
∑
(γ,q)∈F (X0)×Q+
|β(γ, q)− β′(γ, q)|µ(γ, q)
≥ |β(γ′, q′)− β′(γ′, q′)|µ(γ′, q′) + |β(γ′′, q′′)− β′(γ′′, q′′)|µ(γ′′, q′′)
= |β(γ′, q′)− β′(γ′, q′)|µ(γ′, q′) + |β′(γ′′, q′′)− β(γ′′ , q′′)|µ(γ′′, q′′)
≥
{
|β(γ′, q′)− β′(γ′, q′)|+ |β′(γ′′, q′′)− β(γ′′ , q′′)|
}
min{µ(γ′, q′), µ(γ′′, q′′)}
≥ |β(γ′, q′)− β′(γ′, q′) + β′(γ′′, q′′)− β(γ′′ , q′′)|min{µ(γ′, q′), µ(γ′′, q′′)}
≥ (β(γ′, q′)− β(γ′′, q′′)) min{µ(γ′, q′), µ(γ′′, q′′)}
(∵ β ′ ∈ B and clup(Bq′ (γ′)) ⊆ clup(Bq′′ (γ′′))⇒ β ′(γ′ , q′) ≤ β ′(γ′′ , q′′))
= ε,
which contradicts that ‖β − β′‖ < ε.
9.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. For any β ∈ B and ε > 0, there exists β0 ∈ B0 such that ‖β0 − β‖ < ε
and β0 ≥ β.
Proof. Fix β ∈ B and ε > 0. For each N ∈ N, let ΓN =
⋃
h(γ,q)≤N γ (recall that
h : F (X0) × Q+ → N is an injection). Because each γ is a finite subset of X0, so
is ΓN . Hence, we denote ΓN by {x1, . . . , x|ΓN |}.
We first construct βN0 ∈ B0 as an approximation of β ∈ B such that βN0 ap-
proaches β as N → ∞.39 For each X˜ ⊆ ΓN and q ∈ QN , we set n ∈ N with the
following three properties: (i) β(X˜, q) ∈ ((n − 1)/N, n/N ]; (ii) βN0 (X˜, q) = n/N ;
and (iii) for each (γ, q) ∈ F (X0)×Q+,
βN0 (γ, q) = inf
q′∈QN
βN0 (ΓN ∩ γ, q′)
subject to Bq′(ΓN ∩ γ) ⊇ Bq(γ).
39To be precise, βN0 ∈ B1,M , where M = N × |ΓN |.
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Second, we have that βN0 ∈ B10 because βN0 (γ, q) ∈ QN and βN0 is monotonic.
Third, we claim that βN0 ≥ β. For any (γ, q) ∈ F (X0)×Q+, we have
βN0 (γ, q) ≥ inf
q′∈QN
β(ΓN ∩ γ, q′)
subject to Bq′(ΓN ∩ γ) ⊇ Bq(γ),
while, by monotonicity of β, we have
β(γ, q) ≤ β(ΓN ∩ γ, q′),
for any q′ ∈ QN satisfying Bq′(ΓN ∩ γ) ⊇ Bq(γ). The above two inequalities
together imply βN0 (γ, q) ≥ β(γ, q).
Finally, we show that there exists N ∈ N such that ‖β − βN0 ‖ < ε. For each
(γ, q) ∈ F (X0) × Q+, whenever h(γ, q) ≤ |ΓN |, we have γ ⊆ ΓN , and hence,
0 ≤ (βN0 (γ, q)− β(γ, q)) ≤ 1/N . Thus,
‖β − βN0 ‖ ≤
1
N
+
∞∑
n=N+1
µ(h−1(n))
=
1
N
+
1
2N
(∵ µ(γ, q) = (1/2)h(γ,q)).
By taking N large enough so that N > max{2/ε, 1 + log2(1/ε)}, we obtain
‖β − βN0 ‖ < ε. This completes the proof.
9.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5: For each C ⊆ B and ε > 0, there exists δ(C, ε) > 0 such that, for any
D ⊆ B with d(C,D) < δ(C, ε), we have d(up(C), up(D)) < ε.
Proof. Fix C ⊆ B, ε > 0, and D ⊆ B with d(C,D) < ε. We show that
d(up(C), up(D)) < ε (i.e., we show that δ(C, ε) = ε works for any C).
Take any β ∈ C and β′ ≥ β. Because d(C,D) < ε, there exists β′′ ∈ D such
that d(β, β′′) < ε.
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Let β∗ = β′ ∨ β′′ ∈ up(D). Then we have
d(β∗, β′) = ‖β∗ − β′‖
=
∑
(γ,q)
(β∗(γ, q)− β′(γ, q))µ(γ, q)
=
∑
(γ,q)|β′(γ,q)<β′′(γ,q)
(β′′(γ, q)− β′(γ, q))µ(γ, q)
≤
∑
(γ,q)|β′(γ,q)<β′′(γ,q)
(β′′(γ, q)− β(γ, q))µ(γ, q)
≤
∑
(γ,q)
|β′′(γ, q)− β(γ, q)|µ(γ, q)
= d(β, β′′)
< ε.
By a symmetric argument, taking any β ∈ D and β′ ≥ β, there exists β′′ ∈ C
such that d(β, β′′) < ε, and we have d(β′ ∨ β′′, β′) < ε.
Therefore, we conclude that d(up(C), up(D)) < ε.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. For each player i with type ti, we have A
∞
i (ti) = {β∗}, where for
each m ∈ N and each (γ, q) ∈ F (Xm0 )×Q+, we have
β∗(γ, q) = hm(ti)[clup(Bq(γ))],
where hm(ti) is ti’s belief on X
m.
Proof. Fix m = 1. Then, player i effectively plays a single-person game in which
he reveals his first-order belief only. Suppose by way of contradiction that there
is β ∈ Bi such that β(γˆ, qˆ) 6= h1(ti)[clup(Bqˆ(γˆ))] for some (γˆ, qˆ) ∈ F (X10 ) × Q+.
Then, β is strictly dominated by another β′ ∈ Bi, where β′(γ, q) = β(γ, q) for
any (γ, q) 6= (γˆ, qˆ) and β′(γˆ, qˆ) = h1(ti)[clup(Bqˆ(γˆ))]. Note that such β′ is feasible
because we impose no coherency condition among across different orders of beliefs.
Thus, β∗ must satisfy the truth-telling condition:
β∗(γ, q) = h1(ti)[clup(Bq(γ))].
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The rest of the proof is by induction. Fix m ≥ 2, and assume that, up to
(m − 1)th order, each type of each agent behaves truthfully. Assume by way of
contradiction that there is an action β ∈ Bi such that β(γˆ, qˆ) 6= h1(ti)[clup(Bqˆ(γˆ))]
for some (γˆ, qˆ) ∈ F (Xm0 )×Q+. Then, β is strictly dominated by another β′ ∈ Bi,
where β′(γ, q) = β(γ, q) for any (γ, q) 6= (γˆ, qˆ) and β′(γˆ, qˆ) = h1(ti)[clup(Bqˆ(γˆ))].
Again, such β′ is feasible because we impose no coherency condition among across
different orders of beliefs. Therefore, for any m and (γ, q) ∈ F (Xm0 )×Q+ we have
β∗(γ, q) = hm(ti)[clup(Bq(γ))].
References
[1] Athey, S., “Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 117, (2002), 187-223.
[2] Athey, S., “Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strat-
egy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, vol. 69,
(2001), 861-890.
[3] Athey, S., and J. Levin, “The Value of Information in Monotone Decision
Problems,” forthcoming in Research in Economics, (2017).
[4] Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel, “Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowl-
edge,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 59, (1993), 189-198.
[5] Chambers, C.P., F. Echenique, and N.S. Lambert, “Preference Identification,
mimeo, (2017).
[6] Chen, Y-C., Di Tillio, A., E. Faingold, and S. Xiong, “Uniform Topologies on
Types,” Theoretical Economics, vol. 5, (2010), 445-478.
[7] Chen, Y-C., Di Tillio, A., E. Faingold, and S. Xiong, “Characterizing the
Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs,” forthcoming in Review of Economic
Studies, (2016).
43
[8] Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris, “Topologies on Types,” Theoretical
Economics, vol. 1 (2006), 311-340.
[9] Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris, “Interim Correlated Rationalizabil-
ity,” Theoretical Economics, vol. 2 (2007), 15-40.
[10] Eyster, E., and M. Rabin, “Cursed Equilibrium,” Econometrica, vol. 73
(2005), 1623-1672.
[11] Jehiel, P., “Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium,” Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 123 (2005), 81-104.
[12] Kamae, T., U. Krengel, and G.L. O’Brien, “Stochastic inequalities on partially
ordered spaces”, Annals of Probability, vol. 5, (1977), 899-912.
[13] Mathevet, L., “Supermodular Mechanism Design,” Theoretical Economics,
vol. 5, (2010), 403-443.
[14] McAdams, D., “Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information,”
Econometrica, Vol. 71, (2003), 1191?1214.
[15] Mertens, J-F., and S. Zamir, “Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games
with Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol.
14, (1985), 1-29.
[16] Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts, “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium
in Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, vol. 58, (1990),
1255-1277.
[17] Milgrom, Paul and C. Shannon, “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Economet-
rica, 62, (1994), 157-180.
[18] Milgrom, P., and N. Stokey, “Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge,”
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 26, (1982), 17-27.
[19] Savage, L. J., “ Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations,” Jour-
nal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 66, (1971), 783-801.
[20] Schmeidler, D., “Integration Representation without Additivity,” Proceedings
of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 97, (1986), 255-261.
44
[21] Schmeidler, D., “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Addi-
tivity,” Econometrica, vol. 57, (1989), 571-587.
[22] Topkis, D.M., “Supermodularity and Complementarity,” (1998), Princeton
University Press.
[23] Van Zandt, T., and X. Vives, “Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of
Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 134, (2007),
339-360.
[24] Van Zandt, T., “Interim Bayesian Nash Equilibrium on Universal Type Spaces
for Supermodular Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 145, (2010), 249-
263.
[25] Vives, X., “Nash Equilibrium with Strategic Complementarities,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, vol. 19, (1990), 305-321.
45
